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Abstract
A strand of recent literature shows that a reform of import tariﬀ (export tax) and consump-
tion tax (production tax) that keeps consumer (producer) price unchanged enhances welfare and
increases revenue under plausible conditions. It has been argued that the results provide an ex
post justiﬁcation for the widely implemented reform policies in developing countries that reduce
trade taxes and increase consumption tax like VAT for revenue. We demonstrate that the results
derived so far critically depend on the unrealistic assumption that there is no informal sector in
the economy, implying that each and every commodity in the economy can be taxed through VAT
and production tax. Our results show that, when the feasibility restrictions on the tax instru-
ments imposed by the presence of a large informal and shadow economy is taken into account,
such consumer or producer price-neutral reform reduces both welfare and revenue under plausible
conditions.
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Introduction
The standard tax and tariﬀ reform policies as advocated by the IMF and the World Bank favor
a reduction in the trade taxes with a concomitant increase in some form of a consumption tax,
usually a value added tax (henceforth VAT). It is widely believed, both by academic economists
and policy practitioners, that such a coordinated reform in VATs and tariﬀs reduces the costs
of distortionary taxation for ﬁnancing government expenditure. The basic argument here is
that the tariﬀs are extremely distortionary as instruments of raising government revenue, as they
distort both consumer and producer prices. A consumption tax like VAT, on the other hand,
has some well-known desirable features, like elimination of cascading and of undue protection to
the domestic production of import substitutes. The relevant theoretical literature has focused
on establishing suﬃcient conditions for ensuring a welfare improvement for the following three
cases: (i) reform of tariﬀs and taxes (radial or selective)2 with an inactive government budget
constraint (see, for example, Hatta (1977), Diewert et al. (1989)), (ii) tax and tariﬀ reform when
the government budget constraint is active3 (see, for example, Abe (1992, 1995), Panagariya
(1992), Michael et. al. (1993), Anderson (1999)), (iii) a reduction in tariﬀs (export taxes) with
an increase in the consumption taxes (production taxes) in a way to leave the consumer (producer)
price unchanged. It is shown in the literature that this last type of reform can increase both
welfare and revenue.4 Since trade taxes constitute a signiﬁcant source of government revenue in
the developing countries, and governments there are, in general, ﬁscally starved, the literature in
the last two categories has gained prominence in recent years.5 However, the recent works on
2A radial reform is deﬁned as the most comprehensive one and involves all of the commodities in the economy. A
selective reform, on the other hand, covers only a subset of commodities, including the case of a single commodity
widely analyzed in the literature.
3The government budget constraint is said to be active when a reduction in the revenue due to a reduction in
one distortionary tax can be oﬀset only by an increase in another distortionary instrument, while it is inactive or
passive if a lumpsum component of the budget can be adjusted instead.
4See Hatzipanayotou et. al.(1994) for consumer price-neutral radial reform of import tariﬀ and consumption
taxes, and Emran (forthcoming) for producer price-neutral selective reform of export tax and production tax. See
also, Keen and Ligthart (2001).
5The trade taxes accounted for 27 percent of government revenue in Sub-Saharan Africa in 1992 (Devarajan et
al. 1999). For Africa as a whole, the share of trade taxes in government revenue was 36.4 percent over the period
1975-79, 34.8 percent over 1980-84, and 32.5 percent over 1985-89. The corresponding numbers for Asia are 26.5
percent (1975-79), 24.8 percent (1980-84), and 23.8 percent (1985-89) (see Zee, 1996).
1tax and tariﬀ reform with an active government budget constraint have demonstrated that the
results established earlier in the literature in favor of the current consensus on tax policy reform
are built on fragile grounds. Anderson (1999) shows that it is extremely diﬃcult to guarantee
a welfare improvement from a revenue-neutral radial reform when the existence of non-tradables
in the economy is taken into account.6 Emran and Stiglitz (forthcoming) shows that a revenue-
neutral selective reform in VAT and trade taxes reduces welfare under plausible conditions when
one accommodates the existence of a large informal sector in the economy, which, by deﬁnition,
escapes the VAT coverage. In this paper, we show that the results established in the literature
regarding the last type of reform where tax and tariﬀ reform leaves the consumer or producer price
unchanged also depend critically on the assumption that there is no shadow economy or informal
sector.7 The existence of a large informal and shadow economy implies that the increase in
VAT (production tax) required to neutralize the changes in consumer (producer) price is feasible
only if a commodity is produced and transacted in the formal part of the economy. Once this
feasibility restriction on the choice of commodities for adjustments in VAT or production tax is
taken into account, there are plausible suﬃcient conditions under which such consumer or producer
price-neutral reform reduces both revenue and welfare. The results reported here thus add to
the emerging skepticism about the wisdom of the widely implemented tax reform in developing
countries under the policy conditionalities of IMF and the World Bank.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the basic structure of the
economy. The next section is devoted to the analysis of the consumer price-neutral reform.
Section 3 discusses the results on the producer price-neutral reform. The paper concludes with a
summary of the results and their implications for indirect tax reform in developing countries.
6The empirical exercise in Anderson (1996) shows that the implementation of the standard indirect tax reform
policies reduce welfare in case of Korea, even though the trade taxes are much higher than the consumption taxes
at the initial position.
7The informal sector is deﬁned in this paper to be that part of the economy which escapes commodity tax
coverage. It usually includes agriculture, rural non-farm activities (accounted for in the GDP) along with the so-
called shadow economy. The recent estimates show that the average size of the shadow economy over 1989¡’93 as
a percentage of GDP is 39 percent for developing countries and is 12 percent for OECD countries. When measured
in terms of labor force employed in the shadow economy as a percentage of oﬃcial labor force in 1997 ¡ 98, the
average is 50:1 percent for developing countries and 17:3 percent for OECD countries. In some developing countries
like Nigeria and Egypt, the average size of the shadow economy over the period 1990 ¡ 1993 is 68 to 76 percent of
GDP (see Schneider and Enste, 2000).
2Section 1:The Model
We build the analysis on a simple model of the economy which has been the work-horse in
the literature on tax and tariﬀ policy reform. The economy, endowed with a vector of ﬁxed
factors (L); is a competitive small open economy. It is assumed that there are no non-tradable
commodities.8 All of the commodities are consumed and produced domestically, and are also
internationally traded.9 The set of commodities can be partitioned into four subsets depending
on whether a commodity is produced in the formal or informal sector, and on whether it is an
exportable or an importable. We use x for the set of exportables, m for the set of importables,
f for the set of commodities produced in the formal sector, and s for the set of commodities
produced in the informal sector. The set of all commodities, i.e., the union set of exportables and
importables, is denoted as T: The subset xf (xs) consists of all the exportables produced in the
formal (informal) sector. Analogously, mf (ms) denotes the subset of importables produced in
formal (informal) sector. There are some goods which are not taxable. For simplicity, we lump
together all the untaxed goods into a single good and assume it to be an informal exportable. This
non-taxable informal exportable serves as the numeraire, and is denoted as commodity ‘0’. There
is a representative consumer who owns all the factors of production and maximizes a strictly quasi-
concave utility function subject to the budget constraint. Let E(q0;q;U) denote the expenditure
function where [q0;q] is the vector of consumer prices. So E(:) is the minimum expenditure
needed to achieve utility level U facing the consumer price vector [q0;q]. The production side of
the economy is represented by a revenue function G(p0;p;L) which shows the maximum value of
the national output produced with factors L and a convex technology when facing the producer
price vector [p0;p]. Pure proﬁts, when they exist due to diminishing returns, are assumed to be
untaxed. This implies that the assumption of an untaxed numeraire places restrictions on the
set of admissible taxes. G(p0;p;L) is assumed to be strictly convex in p and strictly concave in
L.10 Both the expenditure and revenue functions are assumed to be twice diﬀerentiable. The
8The assumption of a tradables-only economy, although widely used, is undoubtedly a strong one. We adopt
the assumption on two grounds. First, it helps to compare and contrast our results with those of Hatzipanayotou
et al. Second, as has been shown in the literature, accommodating nontradables in the model makes the case for
such a reform even weaker (keen and Ligthart, 2001).
9This implies, among other things, that the economy is not “marginally closed” with respect to any of the
commodities; all commodities have non-zero international trade both at the initial position and after a reform.
10The revenue function is strictly convex in p if there are some substitutability between untaxed numeraire and
3government raises revenue (R(¿;v;t)) using the trade taxes (¿), VAT (v) and production taxes (t).
The government revenue is returned to the consumer in a lump-sum manner. The world prices
of all the commodities are normalized to unity by suitable choice of units. The price relations in
the economy before policy reform are as follows:
qf = 1 + ¿f + v pf = 1 + ¿f ¡ t
qs = 1 + ¿s = ps p0 = q0 = 1
where ql is the vector of consumer prices, pl the vector of producer prices, and ¿l is the vector
of trade taxes on commodities produced in sector l, with l = f;s , and v is the vector of VATs
applicable only to the commodities produced in the formal sector.
The private budget constraint of the representative consumer equates the expenditure E(q0;q;U)
with the private revenue or GNP, G(p0;p;L) plus the revenue transferred by the government.
E(q0;q;U) = G(p0;p;L) + ΦR(:) (1)
where Φ ¸ 1 is the shadow value of public expenditure or marginal cost of public funds.







(Eqs ¡ Gps) + v0Eqf + t
0
Gpf (2)
where the subscripts to the functions E(:) and G(:) denote the partial derivatives, the prime
denotes a transpose of a vector or of a matrix, ¿ with appropriate superscript denotes the vector
of trade taxes on formal and informal tradables. In addition to the budget constraint of the
consumer and the government revenue function, the equilibrium of the economy is characterized
by the balance of trade condition which we can ignore by Walras law. So equations (1) and (2)
constitute the basic framework for analyzing any tax reform in this economy.
the taxed commodities (see Dixit, 1985, p.344).
4Section 2: Consumer Price Neutral Reform of Import Tariﬀ (Export Sub-
sidy) and VAT
This section is devoted to the case of consumer price neutral reform of VAT and tariﬀs (or
export subsidies). For simplicity and for ease of comparison with the extant literature, we assume
that there are no production taxes, i.e. t = 0 implying t
0
Gpf = 0 in the government revenue
function. The policy experiment involves reducing the trade taxes uniformly or selectively and
increasing the VAT to keep consumer price vector unchanged. Since VAT can be applied to only
the formal commodities, this means that the policy reform applies only to the formal part of the
economy. We leave the prices and taxes unchanged in the informal part of the economy. We
consider both the radial uniform and selective reforms.
Consumer Price-Neutral Radial Reform
Here we consider a reform that uniformly reduces the trade taxes on all formal commodities
and the eﬀects on the consumer price vector are oﬀset by an increase in the VAT. More speciﬁcally,
we focus on the following diﬀerential policy reform:
dv = vd®; d¿f = ¡¿fd¯; dv + d¿f = 0 where d¯ > 0, and d® > 0 are scalars.
This is the policy reform experiment of Hatzipanayotou et. al. (1994) with the feasibility
restrictions imposed due to the existence of an informal economy. As noted by Hatzipanayotou
et. al. (1994) such a policy reform is feasible only under two sets of initial conditions: (i) both
the trade taxes and consumption taxes are harmonized at the initial position, (ii) the trade tax
and VAT rates are proportional to each other. The reform also requires that either there are no
export tax or import subsidy at the initial position, or when they are allowed for a commodity,
only a negative consumption tax (VAT) is admissible (i.e., if ¿i < 0, it is necessary that vi < 0).
Since a reduction in export tax increases the consumer price, it can only be oﬀset by increasing
the subsidy provided through a negative consumption tax (VAT).
5Government Revenue














































































= (¿ + ˜ v)0EqU


















Where Ω = [EU ¡ Φ(¿ + ˜ v)0EqU]. Now, since EU is homogenous of degree one in q, Euler
theorem implies that q
0
EqU = EU: Using this we have Ω = [1+(1 ¡ Φ)(¿ + ˜ v)]
0
EqU. Observe






> 0; under the standard assumption that there are no inferior
commodities in the economy. But with Φ > 1; the sign of Ω is not in general determinate.
However, the requirements of uniqueness and the Walrasian stability of the equilibrium dictate
that Ω > 0, and we assume it in what follows. With Ω > 0; the sign of the welfare change is
given by the sign of the right hand side of equation (6).
Proposition 1:
In an economy consisting of both formal and informal sectors, assume that all formal and
informal commodities are pair-wise substitutes in production and there are no export tax or import
subsidy. A consumer price-neutral radial uniform reform of VAT and trade taxes in such an
economy reduces both welfare and revenue if the following conditions hold:
(i) the production substitution eﬀects within the formal sector are low and that between formal
and informal sectors are high enough,
(ii) the size of the formal sector is lower than a threshold.
Proof
The necessary and suﬃcient conditions for a reduction in government revenue is given by the
following:










Now the quadratic form ¿f
0
Gpfpf¿f > 0, because Gpp is positive deﬁnite given strict convexity
of the GNP function, and all principal sub-matrices of a positive deﬁnite matrix are also positive
deﬁnite, implying, in particular, that Gpfpf is positive deﬁnite. The other part of the right hand
side in inequality (7) (¿s
0
Gpspf¿f ) is a bilinear form and convexity of the revenue function is
of no help in pinning down its sign. However, under the assumptions that formal and informal
commodities are substitutes in production, i.e., Gpipj < 0; 8i 6= j and i 2 f ; j 2 s , and that there
are no export tax or import subsidy, we have ¿s
0
Gpspf¿f < 0. So if the cross substitution eﬀects
in production between formal and informal sectors are strong enough, then the right hand side of
inequality (7) is positive. Now observe that limGpf !0 G0
pf¿f = 0. So there always exists a small
7enough (positive) Gpf such that the inequality (7) is satisﬁed, and consequently, the coordinated
reform of trade taxes and VAT reduces revenue if the size of the formal sector is smaller than a
threshold. Under these conditions welfare also suﬀers, as is evident from equation (6).11 Q.E.D.
The intuition behind the revenue reduction result is simple. Since the consumer price vector
is kept unchanged, the reform works through production substitutions due to the decrease in the
protection to the formal sector following the reduction in trade taxes. But when there is a large
informal sector with close substitutes (in production) of formal sector goods, it results in signiﬁcant
resource outﬂow to the informal sector. As the informal sector production expands, the volume of
competing imports decline (because the domestic consumption is unchanged) pulling down with
it the tariﬀ revenue. Since there are no export taxes, only subsidies by assumption, a higher
output of informal exportables entails higher government expenditure on subsidy as exports go
up one for one given that the domestic consumption remains unchanged. The only positive eﬀect
on revenue comes from a lower expenditure on the subsidy to the formal producers as a group,
because of lower import tax and export subsidy after the reform (given by the term G0
pf¿f). With
a large enough informal economy and strong enough inter-sectoral production substitutions, the
negative eﬀects can dominate and result in a reduction in government revenue. Note that if the
size of the formal sector is small, then the positive eﬀect on the revenue due to the direct eﬀect
of lower trade taxes and subsidies will be insigniﬁcant. A large informal economy, on the other
hand, implies that resources can ﬂow easily out of the formal sector causing large production
ineﬃciencies. A large informal economy thus makes it easier for the right hand side of inequality
(7) to be positive. The above result is extremely important because the size of the informal and
shadow economy is very large in most of the developing countries, and thus it is more likely to
have a reduction in revenue and welfare from such a reform.
Now observe that in the absence of any informal economy, the revenue and welfare eﬀects of
11Note that a negative revenue outcome is over-suﬃcient for a welfare reduction. It is possible to have a revenue
increase but a welfare reduction when the substitution eﬀects make the right hand side of inequality (7) positive
but smaller than the subsidy to the producers.
















The right hand sides of both the equations (8) and (9) are positive under the assumptions
that the GNP function is strictly convex in producer prices and that the producers enjoy subsidy
as a group, implying G0
pf¿f > 0. This is the result derived by Hatzipanayotou et. al. (1994):
Note that the condition in proposition 1 that there are no export tax or import subsidy is
suﬃcient for G0
pf¿f > 0, but not necessary. But if we allow export tax or import subsidy, then
the bilinear form ¿s
0
Gpspf¿f can not be signed in general. However, as evident from the above
discussion, the basic result remains valid even if both export tax and import subsidy are allowed
up to a point.
Consumer Price-Neutral Selective Reform
The above discussion deals with the radial reform that spans the entire formal sector. However,
such comprehensive tax and tariﬀ reform, especially in the context of developing countries, can
rarely be implemented given political constraints. Moreover, as mentioned above, such a consumer
price neutral radial uniform reform is feasible under stringent initial conditions only. This raises
the question if a selective reform where the tax and tariﬀ on a single commodity (or a subset of
commodities) are reformed at a time and in a way to keep its consumer price unchanged can be
a better approach. This section addresses this question.12 Note that the intuition about inter-
sectoral production substitutions which is at the heart of the results on radial reform discussed
above does not have any clean counterpart when a selective reform is considered. However,
the following discussion shows that in the presence of an informal economy, there are plausible
suﬃcient conditions such that a selective reform of VAT and import tariﬀ reduces both welfare
and revenue.
12The case of a selective reform is not treated by Hatzipanayotou et al. (op cit).
9Selective Reform of Import tariﬀ and VAT
Here we analyze the case where the import tax (or export subsidy) on commodity k, ¿k is
reduced and the VAT vk is increased so that the consumer price qk remains unchanged. So we
have




k d¯; dvk + d¿
f
k = 0; d®;d¯ > 0
Observe that, in contrast to the radial uniform reform, no additional initial conditions are
required for feasibility of such a reform. It is easy to check that the revenue and welfare eﬀects of


























































































































































(2:a) Assume that there is no informal segment in the economy and that commodity k bears
the highest production subsidy and is a pair-wise substitute of all other commodities in production.
Then a selective reform of VAT and import tariﬀ on commodity k that keeps consumer price q
f
k
unchanged both enhances welfare and increases government revenue.
(2:b) In an economy with an informal sector, assume that commodity k bears the highest
production subsidy among the subset of formal commodities and is a pair-wise substitute in pro-
duction of all other commodities. Then the implementation of a consumer price-neutral selective
reform of consumption tax and import tariﬀ (export subsidy) reduces both revenue and welfare if
the following holds:
(2:b:i) the tariﬀ rate (or export subsidy) on commodity k is lower than a threshold;
(2:b:ii) the domestic production of commodity k is smaller than a threshold.
Proof
Proof of (2.a)
In the absence of an informal economy, the necessary and suﬃcient condition for a welfare
improvement from equation (14) is as follows:











The last inequality holds because commodity k is a substitute of all other commodities in
production implying Gpkpj < 0; 8j 6= k, and k also bears the highest production subsidy implying





k > 0, from equation (13) it follows that welfare increase is a
over-suﬃcient condition for revenue increase from such a consumer price-neutral selective reform.
Q.E.D.
The intuition for the above result is as follows. Since all other prices in the economy remain
unchanged except for the decrease in the producer price of commodity k, the result critically
11depends on the induced resource reallocation eﬀects. As k is a pair-wise substitute of all other
commodities in production, a lower producer price of k reallocates resources to the rest of the
economy. But k enjoys the highest production subsidy, so a contraction of its production with a
concomitant expansion of the production of all other commodities (with lower subsidies) reduces
government’s expenditure on subsidies which increases revenue. This also reduces production
ineﬃciencies in the economy.13
Proof of (2.b)
When the economy consists of both formal and informal segments, it is easy to check from




























Now the critical threshold ˜ ¿
f
k > 0 if the domestic production of commodity k is small enough










¿jGpkpj > 0 (17)
The last inequality above follows from the assumptions that there are no import subsidy
or export tax implying that ¿j > 0; 8j 2 T and that k is a pair-wise substitute of all other
commodities in production, i.e., Gpkpj < 0; 8j 6= k. It is obvious that a reduction in revenue is
also suﬃcient for a decrease in consumer welfare. Q.E.D.
Observe that the assumptions of no export tax or import subsidy and pair-wise substitutability
of k with respect to all other commodities are over-suﬃcient for the above result. As long as the
pattern of substitutability or complementarity in production and the initial structure of trade




kpj < 0 and ˜ Gp
f
k
> 0, one can ﬁnd a small enough value of domestic
production that ensures the welfare- and revenue-reducing outcome emphasized in proposition
(2:b).
13This last statement depends on the assumption that there are no valid reasons (like learning externalities) to
provide production subsidy to activity k.
12It is interesting to note an implication of the above result. Even if the consumer price neutral
reform of trade tax and VAT on commodity k enhances welfare and increases revenue given a
high enough initial production subsidy, a policy reform that continually reduces the production
subsidy will eventually drive down the subsidy below the critical threshold. So one can not rely
on this strategy to eliminate the production subsidy completely. Also observe that as the tariﬀ
(export subsidy) is reduced, the domestic production of k contracts as well, thus making it more
likely that the condition (2:b:ii) will also be satisﬁed.
Section 3: Intermediate Inputs and Consumer Price-Neutral Tax Reform
The analysis of consumer price neutral tax reform presented so far implicitly assumes that
the ﬁrms do not pay any VAT on the intermediate inputs. One of the important advantages of
VAT is precisely the fact that it allows the producers to claim rebates for the taxes paid on the
intermediate inputs and thus helps preserve production eﬃciency. In the presence of an informal
sector, this production eﬃciency is, however, not preserved, as the informal sector ﬁrms can not
claim rebates on their intermediate inputs purchase given that they do not ﬁle a VAT return. This
also implies that there is an additional source of government revenue in this case; the taxes on
the intermediate inputs not claimed by the informal sector. One might argue that, by ignoring
this additional revenue from VAT, the model used in the previous sections is likely to overstate
the case for a revenue and welfare reducing outcome when the consumer price neutral tax reform
is implemented in an economy with an informal sector. In what follows we incorporate a VAT
rebate system and derive suﬃcient conditions for welfare and revenue reducing outcome from a
consumer price neutral tax reform. The results show that the conclusions reached earlier are, if
anything, strengthened in an extended model with VAT rebates on the intermediate inputs for
the formal ﬁrms.
We keep the model set-up as close as possible to the basic model described in section 1. In
the model of section 1, the production side of the economy is represented by an aggregate revenue
function (GNP function) which presumes production eﬃciency. However, as noted above, in the
presence of intermediate goods under a VAT rebate system , production eﬃciency fails, as the ﬁrms
in the formal and informal sector face diﬀerent prices for the same intermediate inputs covered by
13VAT.14 The standard way of modeling the production side of the economy when producer prices
are sector speciﬁc is to have two separate revenue functions for formal and informal sectors. This,
however, complicates the algebra substantially as one needs to keep track of sectoral allocation of
ﬁxed factors L. We adopt a much simpler approach by redeﬁning the commodity space for the
production side of the economy that makes it possible to rely on an aggregate revenue function
and thus allows us to ignore the inter-sectoral allocation of the ﬁxed factors. The trick is to
treat the same intermediate good as two diﬀerent commodities in the aggregate revenue function
depending on the location of the ﬁrm (formal vs. informal) producing or using the intermediate
good. Denoting the subset of commodities used as intermediate inputs as r, for any intermediate
input k 2 r, k 2 m; we have two producer prices in the private revenue (GNP) function
p
rf
k = 1 + ¿r
k
prs





k is the price faced by the formal ﬁrms under the assumption that there is no duty
drawback on tariﬀ while the price faced by the informal ﬁrms is prs
k that reﬂects both the tariﬀ
and the VAT. With duty drawback on tariﬀ, the price faced by the formal ﬁrms is the world
price, i.e., p
rf
k = 1: Note that an implicit assumption in this formulation is that there is no inter-
sectoral trade in intermediate goods; in particular, the formal ﬁrms are assumed not to be able to
resell the imported intermediates to the informal ﬁrms at a higher price (VAT inclusive price).15
If the formal ﬁrms can freely import for the purpose of reselling to the informal sector, then in
equilibrium, the informal ﬁrms will also face the same price as the formal ﬁrms and there will be
no government revenue from VAT on intermediate goods.16 We concentrate on the case where
both formal and informal sector ﬁrms are net buyers of the intermediate inputs and there is no
14Similar production ineﬃciency can result from the duty drawback system where a set of privileged ﬁrms can
claim duty drawback on the tariﬀ on intermediate imports, as is the case in the widely used export promotion
policies in developing countries.
15Note that when a formal ﬁrm sells intermediate inputs to an informal ﬁrm, the latter does not have any incentive
to insist on the VAT receipt, as, by deﬁnition, it does not ﬁle for VAT return. In such a transaction, it is highly
likely that the transacting parties will share the ‘VAT revenue’ between themselves, thus adversely aﬀecting the
government revenue.
16If we allow intersectoral trade but the volume of intermediate imports by the formal ﬁrms is regulated, then
the formal ﬁrms essentially face two prices for each intermediate good, one as the user of the input (1 + ¿k) and
another as a seller to the informal sector (1 + ¿k + vk). The model becomes more involved in this case.
14inter-sectoral arbitrage in intermediate inputs. We do not preclude the ﬁnal consumption of these
intermediate inputs, with the ‘pure intermediate inputs’ as a special case corresponding to zero
ﬁnal consumption. Our formulation also subsumes the case of ‘pure imported intermediate inputs’
´ a la Lopez and Panagariya (1992) where there is no domestic production (or ﬁnal consumption) of
the imported intermediates. The subsets of commodities f and s are now interpreted as consisting
of only the ﬁnal consumption goods produced in the formal and informal sectors respectively.17 As
in the basic model, we ignore the non-tradables, and each commodity can be either an importable
(m) or an exportable (x). So, in the GNP function, the commodity space is now partitioned





consumer side of the economy remains essentially unchanged, with the understanding that when
used for ﬁnal consumption the location of the production of a commodity is immaterial, and we





With the addition of the VAT on the intermediates unclaimed by the informal ﬁrms, the total











(Eqr ¡ Gprs) + ¿r= ¡




(¡Gprs) is the revenue generated from the unclaimed VAT rebates from the informal
sector ﬁrms. Also, as in section (2) above, for simplicity, it is assumed that there are no production
taxes, i.e., t = 0.
(3.1) Consumer price Neutral Radial Reform
Again we look at the revenue and welfare implications of a reform that keeps the consumer
price vector undisturbed. Since the producer price faced by the informal sector ﬁrms is equal to
the consumer price (pay both VAT and tariﬀ), it also implies that such a reform leaves the price
of intermediate goods faced by informal ﬁrms unchanged. The price of intermediate goods faced
17Note that these ﬁnal consumption goods are produced either by formal or informal ﬁrms, but not both. In
contrast, the intermediate inputs can be produced both by formal and informal sector ﬁrms. The case where any
given intermediate input is produced either by formal or informal ﬁrms but used by both types of ﬁrms can easily
be handled in our model.
15by the formal sector ﬁrms are, however, aﬀected by the reform in the absence of a duty drawback
system.
Proposition 3
In an economy consisting of both formal and informal sectors, assume that (i) all formal and
informal commodities are pair-wise substitutes in production, (ii) there are no export tax or import
subsidy, and (iii) there is a VAT rebate system but no duty drawback for intermediate inputs. A
consumer price-neutral radial uniform reform of VAT and trade taxes in such an economy reduces
both welfare and revenue if the following conditions hold:
(i) the production substitution eﬀects within the formal sector (both ﬁnal goods and interme-
diate inputs) are low and that between formal and informal sectors are high enough,
(ii) the size of the formal sector (ﬁnal goods plus intermediate inputs) is lower than a threshold.
Proof:
We analyze a diﬀerential policy reform of the following form: dvf = vfd®, d¿f = ¡¿fd¯,
dvr = vrd®, d¿r = ¡¿rd¯ and dvf + d¿f = 0;dvr + d¿r = 0: We now take total diﬀerential
of equation (18), keeping in mind that a change in tariﬀ on intermediate good k aﬀects both the







while a change in VAT aﬀects only the informal
sector price due to the VAT rebate system.
The revenue eﬀects of the reform can be written as following (for details, please see the
appendix):
dR(:) = fΨ1 + Ψ2gd¯ (19)


























The ﬁrst term (Ψ1) in equation (19) represents the revenue eﬀect of the reform due to the
production substitutions following the reduction in the producer prices in the formal consumer
goods sector as a result of the reduction in the import tariﬀ or export subsidy, except for the
term G
0
pf¿f which shows the direct revenue eﬀect of the reduction in import tariﬀs and export
16subsidies. The ﬁrst term in Ψ1 is positive (¿f
0
Gpfpf¿f > 0) because of the convexity of the GNP
function, and G
0
pf¿f > 0 given the assumption that all commodities are domestically produced
and there are no import subsidy or export tax. However, all other terms in Ψ1 are negative under
the assumption of universal substitutability of formal ﬁnal goods and formal intermediate goods
in production. So (i) if the cross substitution eﬀects in production are strong enough, (ii) the
production substitutability within the formal consumption goods sub-sector is not strong, and (iii)
the size of the formal consumption goods production sector is small, then Ψ1 < 0. Analogously,
an inspection of the other term Ψ2 shows that it is negative if (i) the cross substitutability eﬀects
between formal intermediate goods sector and all other sectors are high enough in production, (ii)
the production substitution eﬀects within the formal intermediate goods sub-sector is not strong,
and (iii) the size of the formal intermediate goods production is small. So under these conditions,
a consumer price neutral reform will reduce revenue and thus worsen welfare (revenue reduction
is suﬃcient for welfare worsening).
Again, the intuition for the above result is straightforward. Since the producer prices of the
informal sector intermediate goods are not aﬀected by the reform, the only new element is the
production substitutions caused by the change in producer prices for intermediate goods faced in
the formal sector. This eﬀect is represented by the term Ψ2 above. A reduction in the tariﬀ (or
export subsidy) on the formal sector intermediate goods reduces their relative proﬁtability, thus
causing a reallocation of resources to all other sectors, including informal sector production of
intermediate goods. As the production of competing sectors increase, their imports suﬀer and the
tariﬀ revenue also goes down. Also, the net demand for intermediate inputs by the informal sector
is reduced resulting in a reduction in the unclaimed VAT rebates. If the cross substitutability
eﬀects are strong enough, these negative eﬀects can dominate the positive eﬀect on revenue due
to a lower subsidy to the intermediate inputs used by the formal sector ﬁrms (given by the term
G
0
prf¿r), and also a higher import volume and a higher tariﬀ revenue because of a contraction in
formal sector production of intermediate goods (given by the term ¿r
0
Gprfprf¿r).
The Eﬀects of Duty Drawback
In the above discussion, it is assumed that all of the ﬁrms pay import duty on the imported
17intermediate goods. This might, however, not be the most empirically relevant assumption, as the
formal sector ﬁrms might have access to duty drawback, especially when they are exporters. This
implies that there are three diﬀerent groups of ﬁrms in the economy, the formal sector exporters
facing the world price, the formal sector non-exporters facing (1 + ¿k) and the informal ﬁrms
facing (1+¿k+vk). In this case, the consumer price neutral reform of tariﬀ and VAT do not have
any eﬀect on the producer price faced by the ﬁrms with access to duty drawback. This implies
that the production substitution eﬀects are due to the changes in prices of only those ﬁrms who
do not have access to duty drawback. In the special case when all formal sector ﬁrms have access
to duty drawback, both consumer and producer price vectors remain unchanged after the reform
and no revenue can be raised. When most of the intermediate goods are “pure intermediate
inputs” with no domestic production to begin with, the production substitution eﬀects critical to
the above discussion may not be forthcoming, especially when the producer prices are reduced as
a result of the reform.
(3.2) Selective Reform of Import tariﬀ and VAT
We now turn to the case where the tariﬀ and VAT changes aﬀect only a single commodity.
We ﬁrst discuss the case where the commodity under the consumer price neutral tax reform is a
ﬁnal imported good, i.e. k 2 m and k = 2 r . The other case where the reform focuses on a pure
intermediate input is interesting only when there is no duty drawback on tariﬀs for the formal
sector ﬁrms. In the presence of duty drawback for the formal sector ﬁrms, such a selective reform
of intermediate inputs turns out to be rather uninteresting as it leaves the consumer and producer
price vectors unchanged.
Consumer price neutral reform of an imported ﬁnal consumption good
Proposition 4
(4:a) In an economy with both formal and informal sectors and a VAT rebate system for
intermediate inputs, assume that commodity k 2 f bears the highest production subsidy among all
formal commodities and is a pair-wise substitute of all other commodities in production and that
there are no import subsidy or export tax. A consumer price neutral reform of VAT and tariﬀ on
commodity k reduces welfare under the following conditions:
18(4:a:i) the tariﬀ rate (or export subsidy) on commodity k is lower than a threshold;
(4:a:ii) the domestic production of commodity k is smaller than a threshold.
(4:b) In the economy considered in proposition (4:a) above a consumer price neutral selective
reform of tariﬀ and VAT is more likely to be revenue reducing and welfare worsening when there
is a VAT rebate system for the intermediate inputs, but there is no duty drawback system for the
tariﬀ on the intermediate inputs.
Proof:





k d¯; dvk + d¿
f
k = 0; d®;d¯ > 0 is given by the following (for details see the appendix):




































Note that the revenue eﬀects of the reform diﬀers algebraically from the case where there is no
taxes on the intermediate inputs by the term Π2: Under the assumptions that there are no import
subsidy or export tax, we have Π2 < 0 if commodity k is a substitute of all intermediate goods
in production.18 This implies that, taking into account of the tariﬀ on intermediate inputs and
of the unclaimed VAT by the informal sector ﬁrms, in fact, strengthens our conclusions derived
earlier in proposition (2:b) above, and it is more likely to have a revenue reducing and welfare
worsening outcome from a consumer price neutral selective tax reform. The intuition behind the
result is as follows. First consider the implications of the reform for net tariﬀ revenue from


















18We again emphasize that the requirement that there is no import subsidy or export tax is over-suﬃcient for
the results in this paper. Both import subsidy and export tax can be allowed so long as they are not too high and
aﬀect only a relatively small subset of commodities.
19resources to the production of all other commodities including the intermediate inputs. As
the domestic production of the intermediate inputs expands, their net trade volume decreases
(increases) in case of importables (exportables). This implies a lower tariﬀ revenue on imported
intermediates and a higher expenditure on subsidy to exported intermediates, both reducing
government revenue. The important thing here is that the ﬁrst term in Π2 is negative under the
assumption of substitutability.






k which represents the changes in
the unclaimed VAT rebates on intermediate goods following the selective reform. Consider the
eﬀects of the selective reform on the unclaimed VAT rebates. As resources are reallocated to all
other sectors including informal sector production of the intermediate goods, the net demand for
the intermediates by the informal sector as a whole goes down, thus reducing the VAT revenue
from unclaimed rebates. So the second term in Π2 is also negative under the assumption of
substitutability in production. As we have seen before, Π1 < 0 under the conditions of proposition
(4.a) (see the proof of proposition (2.a)). This completes the proof of part (4.a).
The second part of the proposition (i.e., 4.b) follows from the observation that the cross
production substitution eﬀect is only partially operative in case of duty drawback by the formal
ﬁrms implying that the change in revenue from tariﬀs on intermediate goods is now given by the










Consumer Price Neutral Reform of an Imported Intermediate
We consider the case when there is no duty drawback for tariﬀ on the intermediate input
under price neutral reform. So we have k 2 r; and ¿r
k > 0 for both formal and informal sector
ﬁrms. We also assume strictly positive ﬁnal consumption of the intermediate goods.
When the tariﬀ on intermediate input k is reduced marginally and VAT on it is raised to keep


























































Note that the ﬁrst three terms within the bracket on the right hand side of equation (21) are
negative under the assumptions that (i) intermediate good k is a substitute in production of all
other commodities, (ii) the formal sector is a net user of intermediate input k, and (iii) there are
no import subsidy or export tax. As emphasized before, this last requirement is not critical and
can be relaxed up to a point. The last term in equation (21), however, is positive and the net
revenue eﬀect depends on the relative strength of own and cross substitution eﬀects in production
and on the initial structure of the tariﬀ. So the revenue eﬀect of the consumer price neutral









too high. Also note that it is more likely to have a revenue reducing outcome if (i) the net
demand for the intermediate good by the formal sector is larger, (ii) the cross substitution eﬀects
between commodity k and others in production are stronger. We collect these conclusions in the
following proposition.
Proposition 5
(5.1) In an economy with both formal and informal sectors, assume that commodity k is an
imported intermediate input which can be produced and used by both formal and informal ﬁrms
and also can be used for ﬁnal consumption. Also assume that there is a VAT rebate system
for intermediate inputs but no duty drawback on tariﬀ on intermediate goods and there are no
import subsidy or export tax. A consumer price neutral reform of tariﬀ and VAT on commodity
k reduces government revenue and consumer welfare in this economy if (i) commodity k is a









is less than a threshold.
(5.2) In the economy described in proposition (5.1), a consumer price neutral reform of VAT
and tariﬀ on commodity k is, ceteris paribus, more likely to reduce government revenue and
consumer welfare if (i) the net demand for intermediate input k by the formal sector is larger,
and (ii) the cross substitution eﬀects in production between k and all other goods are stronger.
An interesting special case of proposition (5.1) above obtains when the initial tariﬀ on inter-
mediate good k is less than or equal to its world price (which is normalized to one), i.e., ¿
rf
k · 1:
The following Corollary gives a formal statement.
Corollary 1:
In an economy with both formal and informal sectors, assume that commodity k is an imported
intermediate input which can be produced and used by both formal and informal ﬁrms and also can
be used for ﬁnal consumption. Also assume that there is a VAT rebate system for intermediate
inputs but no duty drawback for tariﬀ on intermediate goods and there are no import subsidy
or export tax. A consumer price neutral reform of tariﬀ and VAT on commodity k reduces







(ii) commodity k is a pair-wise substitute of all other goods, and (ii) the own














Follows from equation (21):
Section 4: Producer price-Neutral Reform of Export tax (Import Sub-
sidy) and Production Tax
Even in the absence of an informal economy, the appeal of a consumer price-neutral reform is
severely compromised as it is not suitable for reforming export tax or import subsidy. A reduction
in export tax increases the consumer price and thus to keep the consumer price vector unchanged
a reduction in VAT is required. Since both the trade tax and VAT need to be reduced in such
22a reform, the revenue implication is unambiguously negative, if the taxes are not on the wrong
side of the Laﬀer curve to begin with. As mentioned before, there is an alternative strategy
which is applicable for reforming export tax or consumption subsidy. It keeps the producer
price unchanged by increasing production tax to oﬀset the eﬀects of a reduction in export tax or
import subsidy. As shown recently by Keen and Ligthart (2001) and Emran (forthcoming), such a
producer price neutral reform can increase both revenue and welfare if there is no informal segment
in the economy. In the following we consider both a radial and selective reform of export taxes
and import subsidies that keep producer price unchanged with oﬀsetting increases in production
taxes. The main results mirror the results discussed above: the existence of a strategy of double
dividend (or “win-win”) reform critically depends on the assumption that there is no informal
segment in the economy. The price relations are given as follows:
qf = 1 ¡ ¿f pf = 1 ¡ ¿f ¡ t
qs = 1 ¡ ¿s = ps p0 = q0 = 1








(Gps ¡ Eqs) + t
0
Gpf (22)
Producer Price-Neutral Radial Uniform Reform
We ﬁrst look at the radial uniform reform that keeps the producer price constant. We consider
the following diﬀerential policy reform:
dt = td®; d¿ = ¡¿d¯; dt + d¿ = 0 where d¯ > 0, and d® > 0 are scalars.
Proposition 6:
(6:a) In an economy without any informal segment, assume that there are no export subsidy
or import tax. A radial uniform reform in this economy that reduces the trade taxes and oﬀsets
the eﬀects on the producer price vector by increasing production tax increases both revenue and
23welfare.
(6:b) When the above economy consists of both formal and informal sectors, a producer price
neutral radial uniform reform reduces both revenue and welfare if the following conditions hold:
(6:b:1) the consumption substitutability among the formal commodities are low and that between
formal and informal commodities are high enough;
(6:b:2) the domestic consumption of formal commodities are smaller than a threshold.
Proof
Proof of (6.a)
In the absence of an informal economy, the revenue and welfare eﬀects of such a producer
















d¯ > 0 (24)
The last inequality in (23) and (24) follows because the quadratic form ¿
0
Eqq¿ < 0 given the
strict concavity of the expenditure function. Q.E.D.
Proof of (6.b)
In the presence of an informal economy, the revenue and welfare eﬀects of a producer price-



























Note that the ﬁrst term in the right hand side of (27) ¿f
0
Eqfqf¿f < 0; because Eqq is negative
deﬁnite due to strict concavity of the expenditure function, and all the principal sub-matrices of a
24negative deﬁnite matrix are themselves negative deﬁnite which implies, in particular, that Eqfqf
is negative deﬁnite. The second term is, however, positive under the assumption that formal and
informal commodities are substitutes in consumption, given that there are no export subsidy or
import tax. So if the consumption substitutability among the subset of formal commodities are
low enough and the substitutability between formal and informal commodities high enough, the
right hand side of inequality (27) is positive. As a result, given the tax structure, there always
exists a small enough Eqf such that the inequality (27) is satisﬁed. From equation (26) it is clear
that a negative revenue outcome is suﬃcient for a welfare loss. Q.E.D.
The assumption that there are no import tax or export subsidy is used in proposition (6) to
make clear the symmetry between the consumer price neutral reform of tariﬀ and VAT discussed
earlier and the producer price neutral reform of export tax and production tax as discussed in
this section. It is obvious that this assumption can be relaxed up to a point. However, from
an empirical point of view, the assumption that there are no import subsidy or export tax seems
to do less violence to the reality in developing countries than the assumption that there are no
import tariﬀ or export subsidy. Most of the developing countries still rely substantially on import
tariﬀ as a source of revenue. The importance of export tax has gone down signiﬁcantly over the
last couple of decades. The most representative tax structure seems to be one where there is
almost no import subsidy, limited export tax but substantial import tariﬀ and a moderate use of
export subsidy. Given such a tax structure, a producer price-neutral radial uniform reform of
indirect taxes seem less promising. A better strategy seems to be to focus on the selective reform
of export taxes that leaves the producer price constant for a given commodity.
Producer Price-Neutral Selective Reform
Here we analyze the revenue and welfare implications of the following reform:




k d¯; dtk + d¿
f
k = 0; d®;d¯ > 0 (28)
Proposition 7:
(7:a) In an economy with no informal sector assume that the consumption of commodity k
enjoys the highest subsidy and k is a substitute of all other commodities. A marginal reform in
this economy that reduces the trade tax on commodity k; ¿k and increases the production tax tk
25to keep the producer price pk unchanged both increases revenue and enhances welfare.
(7:b) In an economy with both formal and informal sectors, assume that the consumption of
k enjoys the highest subsidy among all formal commodities and k is a substitute in consumption
of all other commodities. A producer price-neutral reform of taxes on k reduces both welfare and
revenue under the following conditions:
(7:b:1) the consumption subsidy on k is lower than a threshold;
(7:b:2) the domestic consumption of commodity k is lower than a threshold.
Proof
(7.a)









ΩdU = ¡Φ¿0Eqqk¿kd¯ (30)
Using the homogeneity property of the expenditure function, we have (by Euler theorem)
Eqkqk = ¡ 1
qk
P















Now in the absence of an informal economy, we can choose commodity k as the one with the
highest consumption subsidy implying (¿j ¡ ¿k) < 0; 8j 6= k: So ¿
0
Eqqk < 0 under the assumption
that k is a substitute of all other commodities in consumption. This guarantees a positive welfare
outcome from equation (30): This also implies that the revenue increases, given that Eqk > 0.
Q.E.D.
(7.b)
Since the choice of commodity k for the reform is now restricted, we can not guarantee that
commodity k will have the highest consumption subsidy among all commodities. Now it is easy




























































kqj: This follows from observing that
since all prices are positive and commodity k is assumed to be substitute of all other commodities




























of the inequality (32) are negative and the revenue declines following the producer price-neutral
reform if the consumption subsidy on k is low enough to satisfy the following:
¿
f
















The above result has important implications for attempts to reform export oriented industries.
If the domestic consumption of an exportable commodity is small and the export tax on it is not
very high, a producer price neutral reform might actually yield a “double loss” rather than a
“double dividend”.
Conclusions
In this paper, we consider the implications of a large informal and shadow economy for the
consumer and producer price-neutral reform of trade taxes and domestic taxes (VAT and produc-
tion taxes). The extant literature shows that, when there is no informal sector, such a reform can
yield double dividend in the sense that it increases both revenue and welfare. It has been argued
in the literature that these results provide a concrete justiﬁcation for the tax and tariﬀ reform
27policies pursued by a large number of developing countries under the policy conditionalities of
IMF and the World Bank over the last two decades (see, for example, Keen and Ligthart (2001),
Rajaraman (2003) and Tanzi and Zee (2000)). We show that the conclusions in favor of a double
dividend tax reform are fragile, and such a reform is as likely to reduce both welfare and rev-
enue when the existence of a large informal and shadow economy in developing countries is taken
into account. This strengthens the growing doubts about the wisdom of the standard tax and
tariﬀ reform policies implemented across a large number of developing countries that emphasizes
the reduction and eventual elimination of trade taxes and shifts the burden of domestic revenue
mobilization on to VAT.
Appendix
(1) Derivation of equation (19)

















































































(Eqsqr ¡ Gpsprs) + ¿r
0 ¡









Utilizing equations (36)-(39) in equation (35) and imposing the restriction that dvf + d¿f =
280;dvr + d¿r = 0 yields equation (19) in the text.
(2) Derivation of equation (20)
























































































































we get equation (20) in the text.
(3) Derivation of Equation (21)












































































































29Plugging back into equation (43) and imposing the restriction that d¿r
k + dvr
k = 0; yields
equation (21) in the text.
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